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PART I: OUTLINING THE PROBLEM 
In 1990, Earl Shriner, a released pedophile, raped a seven-year-
old boy, severed the boy’s penis, and left him to die.1  The public 
outrage that followed this horrific incident in Tacoma, Washington 
led to the passage of that state’s Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”) 
law.  The law provides for post-incarceration psychiatric commitment 
of sex offenders who suffer from a “mental abnormality or personality 
disorder” that makes them sexually dangerous.2  State officials 
deemed the legislation necessary to protect the public against 
individuals like Shriner whom they had been unable to detain under 
the state’s involuntary psychiatric commitment standard following 
release from prison.3  Legislators believed that the adoption of a 
standard that specifically targeted sexual dangerousness while 
incorporating ambiguous mental impairment language would 
facilitate sex-offender commitment. 
They were right.  In the first twelve years of enforcement, 164 
individuals were committed under the law.4  But Washington is not 
alone.  Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted SVP 
statutes patterned closely on Washington’s.5  As of the spring of 2002, 
some 2,229 individuals—virtually all of them male—were civilly 
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 1 Roxanne Lieb, State Policy Perspectives on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING 
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 41, 43 
(Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003) [hereinafter PROTECTING SOCIETY]. 
 2 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 2004). 
 3 Gary Gleb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable 
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 213, 237 (1991). 
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Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 489, 492 (2003). 
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Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 321 n.7 (2003). 
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detained or committed nationally as sexually violent predators.6 
Commentators have debated both the constitutionality of these 
statutes and their merit as a matter of public policy.7  Whatever their 
pros and cons, the Supreme Court’s vindication of this approach to 
managing the risks posed by mentally-disordered sex offenders in 
Kansas v. Hendricks8 presages the continuation of the practice for the 
foreseeable future.  As such, our attention must now focus on the 
issues of statutory implementation9 and release from confinement.  
The latter is especially critical.  While state and local prosecutors have 
been very successful in securing commitments, detainees have been 
profoundly unsuccessful in gaining releases.  For example, in the 
State of Washington, fewer than ten civilly-committed SVPs have been 
granted conditional release from institutional confinement due, in 
large part, to the refusal of state officials to recommend discharge in 
any form.10  Likewise, in Minnesota, only one patient gained 
conditional discharge over a twenty-year period under that state’s 
SVP and sexual psychopath commitment statutes.11 
This intransigence on the part of state officials with respect to 
release must ultimately give way, however, if SVP commitment is to 
remain constitutionally viable.  In Hendricks, where the Justices split 
five to four on the issue of whether Kansas’s SVP law was 
unconstitutionally punitive, Justice Kennedy recognized the statute’s 
potential to convert civil detention into “confinement for life.”12  To 
 
 6 Lieb, supra note 1, at 45. 
 7 See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing 
Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 751-54 (1992); John Q. La 
Fond, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic 
State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 691-701 (1992).  Compare Bruce 
J. Winick, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and Registration and Community Notification 
Laws: Policy Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505 (1998) (urging, as a matter of 
constitutional law, stricter limits on the use of involuntary civil commitment), and 
Janus & Logan, supra note 5 (positing that statutes which authorize confinement 
beyond what is a reasonable time for the accomplishment of treatment goals 
contravene the doctrine of substantive due process), with John Kip Cornwell, 
Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that sexual predator legislation is constitutional). 
 8 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 9 See John Kip Cornwell et al., The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act: Analysis 
and Recommendations for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders in New Jersey, 24 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 1, 36-41 (1999). 
 10 Bruce J. Winick et al., Outpatient Commitment’s Next Frontier, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 159, 172 (2003).  See generally Sarah Duran, Expert Faults McNeil Plan for Sex 
Predators, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), July 10, 2001, at A1. 
 11 Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries 
on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 205-06 (1996). 
 12 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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this end, his concurrence warned state officials not to use the civil 
system “to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident 
plea bargain on the criminal side”;13 while incapacitation is a 
legitimate objective of psychiatric hospitalization, deterrence and 
retribution are not. 
The indefinite detention of all those committed as SVPs would 
promote the conflation of civil and criminal incapacitation of which 
Justice Kennedy warns.  Recognizing, perhaps, the untenability of this 
result, some jurisdictions have begun to release SVPs into the 
community in greater numbers.  For example, whereas only forty-
nine SVPs had gained release by the year 2000,14 sixty-nine were 
released by 2002—an increase of over forty percent.15 
As these numbers increase, the need for community-based 
treatment will grow as well.  This eventuality will create a significant 
problem because of the critical shortage of clinicians qualified to 
treat this unique patient population.16  Indeed, given the difficulty 
jurisdictions have had in securing resources to hire and train 
psychologists and social workers to staff their inpatient programs, it is 
hard to imagine how burgeoning outpatient needs will be satisfied.  
For example, at the time of his initial SVP commitment, Leroy 
Hendricks was receiving treatment that was non-existent at worst and 
“meager”17 at best.  Even ten months later, the facility’s clinical 
director testified that SVPs were receiving essentially no treatment 
and that the program was woefully understaffed.18 
The State of Washington has encountered similar problems in 
implementing its SVP statute.  In 1994, a superior court judge found 
that the state’s Special Commitment Center (“SCC”) for SVPs was 
failing to provide constitutionally adequate treatment based, inter 
alia, on the “[l]ack of sufficient staff trained, experienced and 
certified in [the] treatment of sex offenders.”19  That same year, a 
federal court also found the treatment program to be constitutionally 
 
 13 Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 14 John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law and 
Recommendations for Keeping Them from Skyrocketing, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note 
1, at 288. 
 15 Fitch, supra note 4, at 492. 
 16 See Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington’s Sexually Violent 
Predator Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597, 624 (1992). 
 17 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367. 
 18 Id. at 392-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 19 Orders on Motions to Dismiss Because of Unconstitutional Conditions of 
Confinement at 4, In re Detention of Pedersen, 93-2-09933-9 (King Co. Supr. Ct. Mar. 
7, 1995). 
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inadequate.20  The court entered an injunction requiring 
improvements in a host of areas, including staffing, in order to bring 
the SCC into constitutional compliance.21  Five years later, however, 
the SCC remained non-compliant principally because of the state’s 
failure to allocate sufficient resources for necessities such as staffing 
and training.22  Only after an order of contempt was entered against 
the state in November 1999, which assessed significant monetary 
penalties for each day the SCC remained non-compliant, did the state 
allocate the resources necessary to provide adequate staffing and 
treatment.23 
The problems associated with resource availability for inpatient 
treatment are even more pronounced in the outpatient context.  
Consider, for example, the situation in New Jersey.  New Jersey is 
relatively unusual in that it has a separate correctional facility in 
Avenel for repetitive and compulsive sex offenders.24  Inmates housed 
at this facility receive therapy throughout their period of 
incarceration.  Those who are civilly committed as sexually violent 
predators at the end of their sentences, whether or not they had 
served their time at Avenel,25 would also receive therapy at state 
 
 20 Order and Injunction, Turay v. Weston, No. C91-664WD, U.S. Dist. Court, W.D. 
Wash., June 3, 1994. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1152-53 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 23 Id. at 1154, 1160. 
 24 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-1 (West Supp. 2004), which states: 
[w]henever a person is convicted of the offense of aggravated sexual 
assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping 
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-1, 
endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct 
which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to 
subsection a. of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4, endangering the welfare of a 
child pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection b. of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:24-4, or an attempt to commit any such crime, the judge shall order 
the Department of Corrections to complete a psychological 
examination of the offender, except the judge shall not require a 
psychological examination if the offender is to be sentenced to a term 
of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.  The examination 
shall include a determination of whether the offender’s conduct was 
characterized by a pattern of repetitive compulsive behavior and, if it 
was, a further determination of the offender’s amenability to sex 
offender treatment and willingness to participate in such treatment.  
The court’s order shall contain a determination of the offender’s legal 
settlement in accordance with subdivision D of article 3 of chapter 4 of 
Title 30 of the Revised Statutes. 
 25 That is, not all sex offenders are separately housed at Avenel.  Some are 
excluded because they do not meet the “repetitive and compulsive” standard; others 
are ineligible because, while they satisfy these criteria, they refuse to engage in 
treatment and thus must remain in the general prison population. 
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expense.  Once released into the community from either criminal or 
civil detention, however, state-sponsored treatment is available only at 
the correctional facility in Avenel. 
Parolees who are unable to access those services are seriously 
disadvantaged.  They may look to the state’s network of community 
mental health centers, but very few have expertise in sex-offender 
therapy and many will not accept sex offenders as clients.  Conversely, 
paroled sex offenders may attempt to locate qualified therapists on 
their own, but, even if successful, the cost will ultimately prove 
prohibitive to many.  At present, a federal grant funds aftercare 
services at selected district parole offices for sex offenders whom the 
court has ordered to participate in Community Supervision for Life;26 
thus, at least some released sex offenders who cannot access Avenel 
have treatment options available to them.  The grant expires, 
however, in December 2004. 
As the foregoing illustrates, even in New Jersey, which is among 
the most proactive states with respect to providing sex-offender 
treatment, individuals released from SVP commitment have no 
guarantee of continued access to therapeutic intervention.  Ironically, 
because individuals released from SVP commitment are less likely 
than paroled sex offenders to be subject to Community Supervision 
for Life, they would be far less likely, as a group, to benefit from the 
treatment services provided through the federal grant.  As mentioned 
above, even if released SVPs manage to find treatment providers on 
their own, their ability to pay for these services long term is 
questionable.  Of course, the converse is equally true.  In areas far 
from Avenel and the state’s urban centers, SVPs are likely to find it 
difficult to find clinicians qualified to treat them, whether or not they 
can pay for those services. 
For the time being, these problems are speculative since no one 
has yet been released from SVP commitment in New Jersey, other 
than by court order.  In other jurisdictions, where SVPs have been 
conditionally discharged, treatment policies vary.  In Wisconsin, for 
example, the state does pay for (and require) outpatient treatment.27  
In Minnesota, by contrast, the state will pay for Depo-Provera, an 
antiandrogen medication, but not for group or individual 
psychotherapy.28  As time passes, and SVPs are released in greater 
 
 26 See State v. L.P., 800 A.2d 207, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (affirming a 
sentence that included community supervision for life). 
 27 See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.08(5), 980.12(1) (West 2004). 
 28 Interview with Dr. Anita Schlank, Former Clinical Director, Minnesota Sex 
Offender Treatment Program, Moose Lake, Minn. 
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numbers, current policies introduce the alarming notion that 
mentally disordered sex offenders may be released into the 
community without necessary therapeutic supports.  The specter of 
relapse is troubling not only for the individual but for ordinary 
citizens as well, as they must confront the risk to public safety 
occasioned by this eventuality. 
I believe that this result is not only undesirable from a policy 
perspective, it offends federal constitutional principles.  Due to the 
unique nature of SVP commitment, and the representations states 
have made to justify it, substantive due process requires state-
sponsored outpatient treatment for all those who gain release.  This 
argument does not presuppose a right to post-release treatment for 
civilly committed individuals, nor does it address directly the right of 
the state to detain sex offenders without treatment in a non-
psychiatric facility—though I would consider such a practice to raise 
serious constitutional questions.  My focus is squarely on the 
treatment rights upon release of individuals civilly committed as 
sexually violent predators under statutory schemes similar to the 
Kansas statute addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. 
Hendricks. 
PART II: THE RIGHT TO INPATIENT TREATMENT 
A. The Scope of the Right to Treatment 
A right to community treatment would be illogical if there were 
not a pre-existing right to treatment while housed inpatient.  Thus, 
we must first explore the parameters of inpatient treatment 
requirements.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely 
addressed the right to treatment, the Justices have noted on several 
occasions that the nature of psychiatric detention must be tailored to 
its purpose.29  This mandate would not be met, in the case of sexual 
predators, if they were confined in a psychiatric hospital without 
treatment addressing the mental abnormality that makes them 
sexually dangerous. 
Contrarians may point to Justice Thomas’s embrace in Hendricks 
of civil incapacitation as a legitimate goal of civil detention.30  This 
fact does not suggest, however, that a failure to provide suitable 
treatment over time would be acceptable as a matter of substantive 
due process.  On the contrary, Justice Thomas noted that confining 
 
 29 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 30 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66. 
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SVPs to an institution “expressly designed to provide psychiatric care 
and treatment” clearly “satisfied its obligation to provide available 
treatment.”31 This choice of words is informative, because the statutory 
language, relied on elsewhere in the opinion,32 nowhere references 
the phrase “available treatment.”  It would seem, therefore, that the 
majority is promoting a freestanding duty of state officials towards 
those whom they choose to confine in mental health facilities. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy warned that, while lifelong detention 
may be the “practical effect” of SVP commitment, if it is the statute’s 
very intention, the confinement it prescribes is indistinguishable from 
criminal incarceration and is therefore impermissible.33  A contrary 
purpose is demonstrated most persuasively by the provision of 
treatment.  In this regard, the “presently available treatment” 
standard referenced by the Hendricks majority has significant roots.  
For example, in the seminal case of Rouse v. Cameron,34 the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals held that, to justify psychiatric detention, 
a state must endeavor to provide treatment that is “adequate in light 
of present knowledge.”35  To demonstrate that they are fulfilling this 
obligation in good faith, state officials must monitor a patient’s status 
by making “initial and periodic inquiries” to facilitate the creation of 
a therapeutic program “suitable to his particular needs.”36 
Rouse v. Cameron provides a ready framework for interpreting the 
treatment standard forwarded in Hendricks.  Its emphasis on patients’ 
needs and the development of individualized treatment programs 
precludes long-term reliance on non-specific treatments, such as 
“milieu” therapy, that may not prove beneficial.  Rouse is also 
consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo,37 the Supreme Court’s leading 
right-to-treatment case.  There, in the context of institutionalized 
mentally retarded individuals, the Justices required not only that 
treatment be made available, but also that it be “minimally adequate . 
. . to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”38  The Court 
added that lower courts should bestow “presumptive validity” to the 
 
 31 Id. at 368 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 32 Id. at 367. 
 33 Id. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 34 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 35 Id. at 456. 
 36 Id.; see also Mahoney v. Lensink, 569 A.2d 518, 527 (Conn. 1990) (stating that 
“meaningful” treatment requires individualized effort to help each patient by 
“formulating, administering and monitoring a ‘specialized treatment plan’”). 
 37 457 U.S. 307 (1981). 
 38 Id. at 319. 
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judgments of “qualified professionals” in this regard.39  In 
determining whether the exercise of professional judgment was 
proper in a given case, Youngberg accommodates the use of certain 
factors, including periodic patient re-evaluation and the development 
of individualized treatment programs.40  Incorporating these 
considerations serves not to usurp medical judgment, but rather ‘to 
ensure that professionals . . . apply their knowledge and skills” in 
determining the sufficiency of the state’s treatment efforts.41 
In sum, the foregoing uncovers that individuals who are 
involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals have, at a minimum, 
a right to presently available treatment, reasonably tailored to the 
their disorder(s), and informed by professional judgment.  While a 
necessary precondition to any subsequent right to community-based 
treatment, this entitlement to inpatient treatment does not 
incorporate such a right in and of itself, in light of the lesser liberty 
infringement associated with conditional release.  I believe, however, 
that SVPs who are conditionally discharged from civil confinement 
do, in fact, have such a right.  As I will explain in the next section, 
this right derives from a fusion of the justification proffered by state 
officials in committing SVPs initially and the theoretical 
underpinnings of the right-to-treatment case law. 
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Right to Treatment 
Having examined the potential scope of a right to treatment, we 
must now consider its historical foundations.  Among the various 
theories that courts and commentators have forwarded to justify a 
right to treatment, two have particular relevance in the case of SVPs.42  
The first straightforwardly relies on the statutory guarantee of 
treatment.  For example, in Rouse v. Camaron, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia cited language in the federal 1964 
 
 39 Id. at 322-23. 
 40 See, e.g., Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). 
 41 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 319-20 (1982).  For a fuller discussion 
of these issues, see John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens 
Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 408-12 
(1998). 
 42 A third theory relies on the state’s authority as parens patriae to provide care 
and treatment for those citizens who are unable to care for themselves.  Accordingly, 
due process requires treatment when citizens are deprived of liberty “upon the 
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons.”  Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (D. Ala. 1971).  Because the civil confinement of 
sexual predators is based overwhelmingly on the state’s police power authority to 
protect its citizens rather than its beneficient parens patriae powers, this theory has 
little relevance in this context. 
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Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act specifying “[a] person 
hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his 
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and 
treatment.”43  Likewise, in Welsch v. Likins,44 the district court derived a 
treatment mandate from statutory authority permitting state officials 
to hospitalize involuntarily any “mentally deficient” individual who 
“requires treatment or supervision for his own good or the public 
welfare.”45  Since hospitals were defined in the statute as places 
“equipped to provide care and treatment,” when state officials choose 
to place citizens in hospitals against their will, those citizens have a 
right to receive treatment.46 
The SVP statutes also reference treatment, as this prototypical 
provision from the State of Washington illustrates: 
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group 
of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental 
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the existing 
involuntary treatment act . . . which is intended to be a short-term 
civil commitment system that is primarily designed to provide 
short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders 
and then return them to the community.  [By] contrast, sexually 
violent predators generally have personality disorders and/or 
mental abnormalities which are unamenable to existing mental 
illness treatment modalities and those conditions render them 
likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.  The legislature 
further finds that sex offenders’ likelihood of engaging in repeat 
acts of predatory sexual violence is high . . . .  The legislature 
further finds that the prognosis for curing sexually violent 
offenders is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very 
long term, and the treatment modalities for this population are 
very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people 
appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment 
act.47 
In Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that Kansas’s 
SVP law, which is fundamentally similar to Washington’s, obligates 
state officials to provide treatment.48  It does not matter that the 
primary purpose of these laws is to separate those committed under 
them from society.  Even if treatment is merely an “ancillary” goal, 
 
 43 Rouse, 373 F.2d at 453. 
 44 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974). 
 45 Id. at 500 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 subd. 5). 
 46 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 subd. 8). 
 47 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2004); see also 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws     
§ 10; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606 (West 2004). 
 48 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367. 
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having declared that the state will provide it, it cannot fail to do so.49 
A second justification for a right to treatment, known as the quid 
pro quo theory,50 posits that the state must give individuals who are 
involuntarily civilly committed something in exchange for their loss 
of liberty.51  If the restraint on freedom is based on a need for 
treatment, the quid pro quo is the provision of that treatment.  It 
does not matter if treatment is not the primary motivation for 
detention; even if the deprivation of liberty is based only in part on 
the promise of treatment, the representation is sufficient to force the 
state’s hand.52 
 
PART III: LOCATING A RIGHT TO POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY    
TREATMENT FOR SVPS 
While the foregoing identifies a right to presently available 
treatment for civilly committed SVPs based on a statutory guarantee 
and a quid pro quo theory, these considerations do not suggest that 
SVPs have any right to state-sponsored treatment once they are 
discharged into the community.  State constitutions may provide 
certain community-treatment rights for mentally ill individuals.53  
There may also be some entitlement to community-based services 
based on state statutes.  These provisions are likely, however, to 
provide only short-term treatment54 and to face practical challenges 
based on funding shortages.55 
A. Statutory and Quid Pro Quo Imperatives 
Significantly, no court has yet to embrace any federal 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the Experts: From Deference to 
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 687-88 (1992). 
 51 See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 427 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976) (holding 
that where an individual is confined against his will for reason other than 
commission of criminal offense, the state must provide a benefit in exchange for loss 
of liberty), aff’d on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th  Cir. 1979); see also Donaldson v. 
O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th  Cir. 1974) (stating that outside the criminal 
context, “there must be a quid pro quo extended by the government to justify 
confinement”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 52 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 53 Anthony B. Klapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for 
Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1993). 
 54 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-185 (1991) (obligating state mental health 
department “to provide adequate transitional treatment and care for all patients 
released after a period of involuntary confinement”). 
 55 Klapper, supra note 53, at 816. 
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constitutional obligation to provide treatment once discharged from 
institutional confinement.  I believe, however, that such a right does 
exist for individuals committed under modern SVP statutes.  This 
obligation derives principally from the legislative “findings” 
highlighted above.  Those findings specify that SVPs subject to civil 
commitment: (1) are extremely sexually dangerous; (2) are likely to 
reoffend; and (3) have “very long-term” treatment needs that are 
different from those of other individuals subject to involuntary 
psychiatric detention.56  Because SVPs typically do not have a mental 
disorder sufficient to qualify them for commitment under pre-
existing standards for involuntary psychiatric detention, “special” laws 
are necessary and should be specifically tailored to SVPs’ unique 
mental impairment and the resulting dangers it produces.57 
Drawing a distinction between SVPs and other psychiatric 
patients makes sense.  Many of the latter have mental illnesses that, 
based on pharmacological advances, do not require long-term 
confinement.  Accordingly, involuntary psychiatric commitment is 
ordinarily intended “to provide short-term treatment to individuals 
with serious mental disorders and then return them to the 
community.”58  Once in the community, these individuals can receive 
follow-up services through the network of clinical providers available 
privately or through community mental health centers. 
SVPs, however, are very differently situated.  Unlike other 
psychiatric patients, their mental “abnormalities”59 require specialized, 
long-term treatment.60  The goal of treatment for this “small group of 
extremely dangerous”61 mentally disordered sex offenders is not to 
“cure” them; indeed, the state has acknowledged that these 
individuals have little chance of being “cured” of their disorders.62  
Instead, treatment is designed to achieve a degree of recovery 
sufficient to allow them to re-enter the community. 
Since discharged SVPs are not “cured,” it would be unrealistic at 
best, and disingenuous at worst, to expect that they would be able to 
 
 56 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 57 Not all SVP statutes explicitly contain the legislative findings referenced above.  
However, the statutes are fundamentally similar in all significant respects in terms of 
content, sentiment and intent; all provide for treatment; and all are patterned after 
the Washington statute which did contain such findings.  Thus, it is appropriate to 
give the findings full force when construing SVP statutes. 
 58 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2004). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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sustain their progress without therapeutic reinforcement.  As the 
discussion in Part I indicated, however, the willingness to provide this 
treatment varies widely among the states.63  This problem is 
compounded when SVPs relocate to areas away from urban centers 
where clinicians experienced in providing sex-offender therapy are in 
especially short supply or, when services are available but released 
SVPs cannot afford them. 
It is my belief that states are obligated, as a matter of 
constitutional due process, to provide these services to discharged 
SVPs.  States cannot justify their authority to confine SVPs in a 
psychiatric facility indefinitely to address their unique, long-term 
treatment needs and then refuse, upon conditional release, to 
provide the very treatment that they have acknowledged is necessary 
to allow them to gain their freedom.  The state would be effectively 
saying: “You have a special condition that makes you dangerous and, 
because of it, we are going to confine you for a long time during 
which you will be treated to reduce that risk.  At the point at which 
your therapy has succeeded such that you can begin to re-integrate 
into the community, we can stop providing treatment so that you can 
regress and return to inpatient hospitalization for another indefinite 
period.” 
In addition to contravening the state’s statutory guarantee, this 
result would also violate quid pro quo principles.  The state would, on 
the one hand, justify the restraint on liberty by the need for ongoing, 
long-term treatment to restore it and, on the other hand, take that 
treatment away the moment its success became manifest.  As Judge 
Becker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted, “due 
process dictates that the benefit to which the civilly committed are 
entitled is the habilitation to enable them to leave their 
commitment.”64  By denying SVPs the right to state-sponsored, 
outpatient treatment, the state would be nullifying this entitlement. 
This is not only unjust, it invokes the kind of animus that Justice 
Kennedy warned of in Hendricks.  There, the Justice noted, that when 
civil confinement becomes a mechanism for retribution or general 
deterrence, it loses its constitutional moorings.  The problem is not 
that committed SVPs face potentially life-long commitment;65 the 
difficulty lies, instead, with structuring a civil commitment system to 
promote that result. 
 
 63 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
 64 Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 94 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring). 
 65 Hendrcks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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B. The Role of Treatment Efficacy 
Critics may argue against my position on the ground that 
treatment is insufficiently effective to obligate the state to provide it 
upon conditional release.  Indeed, treatment efficacy remains a 
controversial topic among commentators and researchers.66  
Arguably, the most comprehensive review of the psychological 
treatment for sex offenders is that conducted by the Collaborative 
Outcome Data Project Committee.  In 2002, the project’s first report 
positively associated treatment with reductions in both sexual and 
general recidivism.67  In four to five years of follow-up, sexual 
recidivism in the treatment group was ten percent versus seventeen 
percent in the non-treatment group.  Additionally, general recidivism 
was at thirty-two percent for those receiving treatment versus fifty-one 
percent for the untreated.68  The significance of these findings has 
been challenged, however, based on alleged flaws in the research 
design, including: (1) that the comparison groups were not 
comparable, and (2) that the evidence was contaminated by the 
inclusion in the comparison groups of higher-risk offenders who 
would have refused or quit treatment if they had had the choice. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve this ongoing debate 
about treatment efficacy to vindicate a constitutional right to 
community treatment because the states have chosen, in their 
legislative findings, to declare that treatment is necessary to reduce 
the risks of recidivism posed by this population.  By denying 
treatment upon release, the states would, by their own admission, be 
setting SVPs up for failure and recommitment.  In addition, by 
denying SVPs the proverbial “benefit of the bargain,” the state would 
extinguish the possibility of SVPs living in a less restrictive setting 
 
 66 Compare Robin Fretwell Wilson, Cradles of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a 
Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 298-99 (2002) 
(arguing that treatment can lower the risk of future offenses and courts should take 
into account an offender’s participation in treatment), and James A. Billings & 
Crystal L. Bulges, Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Wise or Wicked?, 
52 ME. L. REV. 175, 243-45 (2000) (highlighting flaws in research techniques that 
measure treatment efficacy, but concluding that “[t]reatment is also integral to sex 
offense solutions”), with R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk 
Management?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 68 (1998) (noting that research 
regarding whether SVPs benefit from treatment is inconclusive), and Kirk Heilbrun 
et al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention, and Decision Making, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 138, 169 (1998) (concluding that “[p]rogress in treatment 
is not a powerful risk-reduction indicator”). 
 67 R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the 
Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & 
TREATMENT 169 (2002). 
 68 Id. 
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than that of the institution, a result which raises distinct 
constitutional concerns.  In litigation over Washington’s SVP statute, 
a federal judge has held that providing for community transition to a 
less restrictive setting is a vital and necessary part of professional 
minimum standards.  “Without LRAs [least restrictive alternatives],” 
the court commented, “the constitutional requirement of treatment 
leading, if successful, to cure and release cannot fully be met.”69 
C. Advocating Affirmative Rights 
Another potential criticism of my proposal is that it 
impermissibly imposes on the states affirmative obligations where the 
state does not assume full custody and control over the individuals to 
whom services are provided.  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services,70 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
state has no constitutional duty to protect a child from his parent 
after receiving reports of possible abuse.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court noted that “[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government 
interference, it does not confer an entitlement to government aid as 
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”71 
The context of DeShaney is distinguishable, however, from that 
with which this Article is concerned.  Most significantly, DeShaney 
dealt with purely private conduct; the deprivation of liberty to which 
the complainant was subjected was not created by the state, nor was 
the minor in state custody when the violence occurred.  By contrast, 
even when SVPs are no longer confined institutionally, the state still 
restrains their freedom substantially.  Common conditions of 
discharge include, for example, mandatory supervision when outside 
the residence, electronic monitoring, no drug or alcohol use, no 
access to pornography, and restricted access to “vulnerable” 
populations.72  Thus, the state impedes the liberty of sexual offenders, 
but does offer, in exchange, treatment to allow targeted SVPs to gain 
freedom.  By creating this interest in treatment as part of the 
commitment process, states should not be permitted to abandon it by 
removing some restrictions on liberty.73 
 
 69 Turay v. Selig, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 70 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 71 Id. at 196 (quoting Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)). 
 72 Fitch, supra note 4, at 492. 
 73 Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that 
creating constitutionally protected property interest obligates the state to support 
that interest adequately). 
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Moreover, DeShaney itself recognizes that affirmative duties of 
care may exist in certain circumstances where individuals face less 
than total deprivation of liberty.  The Court opined that if state 
officials had removed Joshua DeShaney from his home and placed 
him in a foster home run by “its agents,” the situation might be 
“sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give 
rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”74  Like foster care, community 
placement of an SVP is less restrictive than institutional care, though 
the state imposes conditions and retains substantial oversight that 
permits restoration of institutional custody if the situation warrants.  
Thus, in both instances, this exercise of state authority and control is 
sufficient to give rise to affirmative obligations on the part of the state 
to provide care and treatment.75 
D. Equal Protection 
Because the community treatment rights that I am advocating 
would apply only to SVPs discharged from civil commitment, some 
might argue that the rights of other individuals discharged from 
involuntary psychiatric detention are violated under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To evaluate this 
claim, it is first necessary to identify the appropriate level of scrutiny.  
This task is challenging, since the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
spoken with clarity about the standard of review it applies in cases 
involving involuntary commitment classifications. 
Early cases seemed to require only that these classifications be 
rationally or reasonably related to legitimate government interests.76  
However, the 1992 case of Foucha v. Louisiana77 suggested greater 
scrutiny, mandating that the state provide a “particularly convincing 
reason” for continuing to commit insanity acquittees who had 
 
 74 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
 75 See Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that public 
school officials may have affirmative duties to render aid to school children under 
the Due Process Clause); accord Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. 
Dwares v. New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1994) (positing that affirmative duties may 
arise in the absence of state custody where state actors play a part in the liberty 
deprivation). 
 76 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (concluding that it was 
not “unreasonable” for Congress to provide for the “automatic” commitment of a 
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity); Jackson v. Indiana, 604 U.S. 715, 
729 (1972) (requiring a “reasonable justification” for involuntary commitment 
classification); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966) (stating that 
“classification of patients for involuntary commitment . . . may not be wholly 
arbitrary”). 
 77 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
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regained mental health.  The Court’s two most recent decisions, both 
concerning Kansas’s SVP law, do not explicitly reference any 
particular standard of review.  In Hendricks, the Court stated simply 
that involuntary civil commitment statutes that “narrow[] the class of 
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control 
their dangerousness” are constitutional.78  Five years later, Kansas v. 
Crane79 specified that proof of a “serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior” is an essential requirement of substantive due process.80 
By mandating proof of a volitional impairment not specified in 
the Kansas statute, Hendricks and Crane suggest a level of scrutiny 
higher than the rational basis test, which would have required 
upholding the statute as written.  In addition, because the 
stigmatizing effect of mental illness undermines respect and dignity 
and promotes social isolation,81 I have repeatedly advocated for 
heightened scrutiny in evaluating classifications affecting involuntary 
civil commitment.82 
That being said, I believe that there is a “particularly convincing 
reason” or “exceedingly persuasive justification”83 for treating SVPs 
differently from other individuals discharged from involuntary 
psychiatric detention with respect to community treatment.  As 
discussed above, individuals committed as SVPs have treatment needs 
that are distinct from those of other patients in terms of modality and 
duration, a fact which states have acknowledged in enacting this 
legislation.  Moreover, because the failure to provide necessary 
treatment carries specific risks to public safety that are unique and 
deeply troubling, the state may use different procedures to guard 
against those risks. 
E. Alternative Approaches to Sex Offender Commitment 
Because the constitutional right to community treatment that I 
 
 78 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 
 79 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 80 Id. at 413. 
 81 L.J. Skinner et al., Generalizability and Specificity of the Stigma Associated with the 
Mental Illness Label: A Reconsideration Twenty-five Years Later, 23 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 
3 (1995). 
 82 See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered “Super Criminals”: A 
Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651, 677-89 (1996); John Kip 
Cornwell, Sex Offenders and the Supreme Court: The Significance and Limits of Kansas v. 
Hendricks, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 197 (2003); John Kip Cornwell & 
Raymond Deeney, Exposing the Myths Surrounding Preventive Outpatient Commitment for 
Individuals with Chronic Mental Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 209 (2003). 
 83 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996) (defining heightened 
scrutiny standard in context of gender-based discrimination). 
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am vindicating relies on legislative findings specific to SVP 
commitment laws, the entitlement to such services would not 
necessarily apply to discharge from other systems of civil detention.  
Should we worry, therefore, that states will create alternative means of 
civilly confining SVPs to avoid providing community treatment upon 
release? 
The experience in New Jersey is instructive in this regard.  In 
1994, New Jersey declared that certain sex offenders “suffer from 
mental illness which renders them dangerous to others.”84  The 
legislature then facilitated their detention under the existing civil 
commitment law by redefining mental illness as “a current, 
substantial disturbance of thought, mood, perception or orientation 
which significantly impairs judgment, capacity to control behavior or 
capacity to recognize reality . . . .”85  This “clarification” of the state’s 
mental illness standard was subsequently held constitutional by the 
state supreme court in a case brought by a sex offender detained 
under it.86  In so finding, the justices also overturned the decision of 
the appellate court that the petitioner was insufficiently mentally ill to 
warrant ongoing detention.  Medical testimony concluding that he 
suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and had fantasies of 
sexual sadism were adequate to support the trial court’s order for 
continued psychiatric detention.87  
The foregoing suggests that states need not resort to novel 
commitment standards to manage mentally disordered SVPs.  It is 
curious, therefore, that more have not chosen to alter their existing 
commitment standards, instead of creating a new, controversial 
commitment formula.  Faced, for example, with a definition of 
mental illness similar to that of the unamended New Jersey statute, 
Wisconsin88 chose to enact a separate SVP statute, patterned after 
Washington’s, rather than altering the definition of mental illness to 
achieve the same result. 
Wisconsin’s reluctance may reflect a tension between the nature 
and purposes of “ordinary” psychiatric commitment and that 
 
 84 Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 134, § 1(a), 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 542, 542 (West). 
 85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West 1994) (emphasis added to denote 
amended language). 
 86 In re D.C., 679 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996). 
 87 Id. at 649. 
 88 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13b) (West 1987) (“‘Mental illness,’ for purposes of 
involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception 
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to 
recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not 
include alcoholism.”). 
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provided under SVP statutes.  Normally, the state’s civil commitment 
authority is based on its parens patriae power to “provid[e] care to its 
citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
themselves” and its police power “to protect the community from the 
dangerous tendencies of those who are mentally ill.”89  Because the 
commitment of SVPs is primarily—some would say exclusively—an 
exercise of states’ police power,90 the “profile” of committed SVPs 
differs markedly from that of most psychiatric inpatients in that the 
former do not typically suffer from mental disorders that pose a 
danger to themselves or impair their ability to live day-to-day in a 
community setting.  In addition, whereas involuntary commitment is 
designed to be short-term,91 the treatment needs of the SVP 
population are necessarily long-term.92 
Because of these differences, attempting to force mentally 
disordered sex offenders into pre-existing commitment schemes 
which do not naturally fit seems unwise.  To that end, 
notwithstanding the above-referenced expansion of its mental illness 
standard, New Jersey enacted a Hendricks-style SVP statute in 1998.93  
The law was urged by the Task Force for the Review of the Treatment 
of the Criminally Insane created by then-Governor Christine Todd 
Whitman in 1996.94  When the task force invited me to meet with 
them to discuss Kansas v. Hendricks and its implications for the care 
and management of sexual predators, I inquired as to why New Jersey 
would need an SVP statute in light of the changes made to 
accommodate sex offender commitment in its existing civil 
commitment statute.  Those who responded opined that offenders 
committed under the expanded mental illness standard were gaining 
release too easily because judges and/or psychiatrists did not 
consider them sufficiently mentally ill to justify indefinite detention.  
Thus, special standards and procedures were necessary to identify 
more specifically the particular dangers and disorders presented by 
mentally disordered sex offenders. 
These remarks illustrate the difficulty in managing SVPs within 
the traditional civil commitment framework.  It is for this reason, 
perhaps, that states have not favored this approach and New Jersey 
 
 89 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
 90 Cornwell, supra note 41, at 403; Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of 
Police Power Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 302 (1998). 
 91 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Cornwell et al., supra note 9, at 2. 
 94 Report of the Task Force for the Review of the Treatment of the Criminally 
Insane 3 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished report, on file with author). 
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abandoned it.  Parenthetically, inasmuch as those who promoted 
adopting an SVP law in New Jersey were motivated by the desire to 
lengthen the duration of civil detention for sex offenders, they 
should be pleased with the results.  According to a survey conducted 
in the summer of 2002, New Jersey had an inpatient SVP population 
of 223 with only two gaining release in the first three years the statute 
went into effect.95 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to the 1990s, the psychiatric commitment of sex offenders 
was largely moribund.  Statutes that existed were little enforced, and 
new initiatives were not on the horizon.96  The Shriner case, and others 
like it,97 changed all this.  They ushered in a new wave of legislation 
that allowed mentally disordered sex offenders to be committed at 
the expiration of their criminal sentences based on mental 
impairments otherwise insufficient for involuntary detention.  As 
these laws proliferated in the 1990s, the legal debate focused on the 
constitutionality of this novel approach to sex-offender containment.  
To this end, the U.S. Supreme Court considered challenges based on 
SVP laws three times between 1997 and 2002.98  Thus, in 2004, we 
have a much clearer picture of the constitutional landscape with 
respect to SVP commitment than we did a few years ago. 
Because the Court has all but foreclosed challenges based on the 
Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, our focus must now be 
on whether the implementation of these laws satisfies due process, 
ever mindful of Justice Kennedy’s admonition that “[i]f . . . civil 
confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general 
deterrence . . . [the Court’s] precedents would not suffice to validate 
it.”99  Persistent refusal on the part of state officials to afford release 
would provide persuasive evidence of this impermissible purpose, but 
simply allowing discharge is not enough.  Because SVPs have unique, 
long-term treatment needs which state officials acknowledged as a 
 
 95 Fitch, supra note 4, at 492. 
 96 Cornwell, supra note 7, at 1297; Gleb, supra note 3, at 215. 
 97 See, e.g., Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (1994) 
(discussing the rape and murder of Stephanie Schmidt by a released sex offender 
that inspired the passage of the Kansas SVP law). 
 98 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) 
(hearing claim that SVP statute violated ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses 
requires proof that law is punitive “on its face” rather than as applied in practice); 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 99 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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basis for confinement and affirmatively obligated themselves to treat, 
the state must continue to provide that treatment in the community 
in fulfillment of their statutory guarantee and corresponding 
constitutional mandate. 
Some discharged SVPs may already be receiving state-sponsored 
treatment; others may not.  Some may be able to find qualified sex-
offender therapists on their own; others may not.  Some may be able 
to pay for such treatment; others may not.  By recognizing the 
obligation of state officials to provide therapeutic services to all SVPs 
discharged into the community from civil commitment, the 
opportunity to retain their freedom will be equally available to all. 
 
 
